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Constitutional Law-Ads on Busses
In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District' the California Supreme Court enjoined a metropolitan transit district from
refusing to accept for display on its busses an advertisement critical
of the war in Vietnam. The transit district is a public body which
operates busses in several California counties. It sells advertising
space above the passengers seats. The district had a policy of accepting only two classes of advertising: (1) advertisements for the sale
of goods and services and (2) advertisements for candidates and
ballot proposals at the time of a duly called election. The Women
for Peace at Berkeley tried to put an advertisement on the district's
busses at the standard rate. It read:
Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to
mankind.
President John F. Kennedy
Write to President Johnson: Negotiate Vietnam
Women For Peace
P.O. Box 944, Berkeley
In keeping with its policy the district refused the advertisement. 2
The California Supreme Court found that the district's policy restricting advertisements was a violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments.3 Transit advertising, the court found, is "an acceptable and effective means of communication." By accepting advertisements the district had opened a forum for the expression of ideas:
"A regulation which permits those who offer goods and services for
sale and those who wish to express ideas relating to elections access
to such forum while denying it to those who wish to express other
ideas and beliefs, protected by the first amendment, cannot be upheld." 4 The dissent denied that the district had opened a forum for
the expression of ideas.
Recognizing the importance of a place where the citizen has a
-- Cal. 2d-, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967). For another
recent case with similar facts and result see Kissinger v. New York City
Transit Auth., 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2 Cal. 2d at - 434 P.2d at 984, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 432. The advertising
on the busses was handled by an advertising agency which leased the space
from3 the district and then sub-leased it. Id.
Id. at -, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
'Id. at -- 434 P.2d at 990, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
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right to communicate, the courts have created 5 the public forum,' a
place where the citizen has access to the attention of his fellows:
Traditionally our public streets, meeting halls, parks and similar
places have been recognized as locations in which this sacred
right may be exercised, not only because such places, being
dedicated to public use, are held in trust for all citizens, but also
because they are usually locations where the ears of 7large numbers of fellow citizens can most effectively be reached.
The existence of a forum, or something like it, is a necessary precondition to an uninhibited, free trade in ideas. Before the public can choose among competing ideas, it must be exposed to them.'
Forums have been created in streets, 9 parks, 10 railway and bus
terminals," and in public (usually school) auditoriums.' 2 The
forum is always created on public property or on private property
which (under the rubric of state action) is treated as if it were
public.13

How the forum comes into existence and the extent to

which the state may regulate it may vary with the type of property
involved.
'In Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), the Supreme Court
held that since the legislature could absolutely prohibit first amendment activities in streets and parks, it could require a license. Id. at 48. Later the
Supreme Court reversed itself holding that such places had been used for
assembly from time immemorial. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Time immemorial, as Mr.
Chief Justice Traynor has noted, dates from 1939. In re Hoffman, - Cal.
2d -,

-,

434 P.2d 352, 355, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1967).

'For a discussion of the public forum with particular emphasis on
"speech plus" see H. Kalvin, The Concept of the Public Forumn.: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 SuPREME CT. REv. 1.
'Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
8 Of course, distributing leaflets and holding meetings in school auditoriums are limited as means of getting different points of view before the
public. Jerome A. Barron has criticized the Supreme Court for indifference
to creating opportunities for expression. To protect an idea after it has
come to the fore, he insists, is not enough. Barron, Access to the Press, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967). "The test of a community's opportunities for
free expression rests .

.

. in an abundance of opportunities to secure ex-

pression in media with the largest impact." Id. at 1653.
'E.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
10
E.g., Niemotoko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
11
E.g., Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"E.g, Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963); Danskin
v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
"Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); In re Hoffman, - Cal. 2d
-, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
The Supreme Court has also
created a limited right of access to persons at their doors. Martin v. Struthers, 319 N.C. 141 (1943) ; Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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The doctrine of the public forum had its solid beginning in the
case of Schneider v. State.4 In that case the Supreme Court struck
down municipal ordinances which flatly prohibited the distribution
of leaflets in city streets. The object of the ordinances was to prevent littering. The Court found them a violation of the first amendment. Streets are "the natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion."' 5 The purpose of preventing
littering was not sufficient to justify such an abridgement of freedom of speech. 6 Later cases suggested that while the state could
regulate such distribution in the interest of traffic flow, it could not
bar it altogether. 17 In cases involving the right to distribute literature on the street, two factors are important. No voluntary act by
the state was required to create a public forum on the street. And
while the state could regulate the forum, it could not close it at will.
At the other extreme is the public forum in school auditoriums.
Dicta in court opinions suggest that the forum is created by the
voluntary decision of the state to open the doors of the school to the
expression of ideas, 8 by allowing one group with a particular point
of view to use the school auditorium after school. These dicta insist
that "the state need not open the doors of a school building as a
forum and may at any time close them," 9 if it closes them to all.
Another group of cases deals with the right to distribute leaflets in
terminals.2" These cases, based perhaps on a somewhat more restrictive reading of Schneider and its progeny, hold that regulations may
be adopted to insure traffic flow, safety, etc. But, as expressed in one
case,
U.S. 147 (1939).
Id. at 163.
16 Id. at 162.
'Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jaminson v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413 (1943). Schneider also recognized the right of the state to regulate
the streets to assure the movement of people and property. 308 U.S. 147,
160.
8 Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545, 171
P.2d 885, 891 (1946); East Meadow Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Educ.,
18 N.Y.2d 129, 133, 219 N.E.2d 172, 174, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (1966).
" Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 547, 171
18308
15

P.2d. 885, 892 (1946). Cases cited note 18 mtpra. Doubt has been expressed

about the assertion that the state is under no duty to open up its facilities
after school. Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup.

Ct. 21962).

Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. N.Y. 1967; In re
Hoffman, - Cal. 2d -, 434 P.2d. 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
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In the absence of proof that the proposed activities ... would
obstruct or hamper the Terminal for transportation purposes,
the Port Authority may not ban such activities altogether. In
balancing the citizen's right to communicate ideas and views
against public responsibility to maintain a free flow of traffid,
the exercise of constitutional rights will be favored unless it is
shown that the prohibition is essential under the circumstances
21
to insure the operation of the Terminal for its primary purposes.
Since it seems difficult to prove that an absolute ban on the distribution of leaflets is essential to ensure the operation of a terminal for
its main purpose, the result may be that the state cannot prohibit
such distribution.
The court in Wirta relied heavily on cases involving public
school auditoriums. 22 These cases, as indicated above, suggest that
school auditoriums need not be opened up to the public after school
hours. But once the privilege of using the auditorium is made available to some in the community it cannot be denied to others for
reasons that are inconsistent with the first amendment. 23 Such a
denial is seen as censorship prohibited by the first amendment. Once
" Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
No case seems to require that facilities be constructed so that citizens
will have a place to exercise their first amendment rights. Rather, opening
up a forum refers to requiring the state to allow a citizen to use a facility
for the exercise of first amendment rights although others have not been
allowed before to use it for that purpose.
" Cases cited notes 18 and 19 supra. The school cases are direct descendants of cases involving streets and parks. See Danskin v. San Diego
Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946). When Danskin
was decided a line of Supreme Court cases had struck down ordinances
and practices which gave city officials unlimited discretion in licensing
parades and in restricting use of parks. See, e.g., Largent v. Texas, 318
U.S. 418 (1943); cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1940). The
reason given is that city officials must not be allowed to censor unpopular
causes by controlling access to the public forum. Largent v. Texas, 318
U.S. 418, 422 (1943).
When city officials have (under such ordinances) attempted to pick
and choose among potential users, their action has been held a violation of
the first amendment. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). In
many of these cases an attack is available under both the equal protection
clause and under the first and fourteenth amendments. Nienotko used both.
Id. at 273. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
.Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d
885 (1946). Some have interpreted these decisions as based on the equal
protection clause. Van Alystyne, Political Speakers at State Universities,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 328, 338 (1963). While equal protection might have
provided an adequate basis, they were decided on first amendment grounds.
In cases of discriminatory denial of equal access to a public forum equal
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the state opens a forum "it cannot demand tickets of admission in
the form of convictions and affiliations that it deems acceptable." 24
Therefore, absent a showing of a clear and present danger, it cannot
open its schools to political discussion but exclude those topics considered "subversive" 2 or "controversial." 2 6 This line of cases has
been summarized by Judge Markel in Buckley v. Meng:
The principle of these cases is the simple one that what the state
cannot do directly it may not do indirectly. Since there is no
power in the state to stifle minority opinion directly by forbidding its expression, it may not accomplish this same purpose
by allowing its facilities to be used by proponents of majority
opinion while denying them to dissenters. 27
Following the principle of the school cases, 28 the court found the
advertising policy of the transit district deficient in two respects.
First, by accepting only election advertisements the district was
choosing between classes of ideas entitled to constitutional protection, allowing the expression of ". . . only those selected, and banning all others." "Thus," the court stated, "the district's regulation
exercises a most pervasive form of censorship."2 Second, the court
insisted that commercial advertising is not speech protected by the
protection and the first amendment often overlap. See Mr. Justice Black's
concurring opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 580-81 (1963);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
2,Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 547, 171
P.2d25 885, 892 (1946).

!d.
" East Meadow Concerts Assn. v. Board of Educ., 18 N.Y.2d 129, 219
N.E.2d 172, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966), on remand 26 A.D.2d 819, 273
N.Y.S.2d 736 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 19 N.Y.2d 605, 225 N.E.2d 888, 278
N.Y.S.2d
393 (1967).
"7Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467 at -, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 at 934 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
The court in Wirta recognized the difference between the school cases
and the case presented by the advertising policy of the transit district. "The
vice is not that the district has preferred one point of view over another
but that it chooses between classes of ideas entitled to constitutional protection, sanctioning the expression of only those selected, and banning all
others. Thus the district's regulation exercises a most pervasive form of
28

censorship."

-

Cal. 2d at -,

434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at

-.

To

bolster its conclusion the court in Wirta cited the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Black in Cox v.Louisiana. In Cox, Negro demonstrators were convicted of blocking public passageways in violation of a statute which prohibited such blockage but excluded labor unions from its operation. Mr.
Justice Black found the statute "censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 379 U.S. at
580-81.
2Cal. 2d at -,
434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
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first amendment.30 On this premise the court found that the policy
of accepting commercial messages in preference to protected speech
violated the first amendment. The argument seems to be that since
the state can prohibit commercial messages and cannot prohibit
pure speech, it cannot restrict its advertising slots to purely commercial advertisements."1
The court in Wirta seems to have held that the advertising policy
of the district had voluntarily opened its bus advertising slots as
a forum for the expression of ideas. Once the characterization is
accepted the result follows: to refuse the advertisement of the
" On this point the majority and the dissent were in agreement. The

conclusion seems essentially correct. Speech whose sole object is the sale

of goods and services can be prohibited altogether. See note 31 infra. However if the speech is the type covered by the first amendment, that protection
is not withdrawn simply because it is published in the form of an advertisement. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). The Supreme Court found that the
advertisement in the New York Times case was not a "commercial" advertisement because, "it communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest
public concern." 376 U.S. at 266. The Court has recently reiterated that
it does not view "purely" commercial advertising as first amendment speech,
though only by way of analogy. "Material sold solely to produce sexual
arousal, like commercial advertising, does not escape regulation because it
has been dressed up as speech.. . ." Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463, 474 n. 17 (1966). The example of commercial expression dressed up
as "speech" suggested by the Court was Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942). Cf. Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 381 (1967). The Court has had
some difficulties in borderline cases such as Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951). There Justice Black joined by Justice Douglas dissented on
the ground that the ordinance interfered with the exercise of first amendment rights. Still, Justice Black reaffirmed his faith in the commercial
non-commercial dichotomy: "Of course I believe that the present ordinance
could constitutionally be applied to a 'merchant' who goes from door to door
'selling pots.'" 341 U.S. at 650. Comment, Freedom of Expression in a
Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 1191 (1965).
-

Cal. 2d -,

434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434. The court

said:
Thus, although a city may not prohibit public distribution of handbills
expressing protected ideas (Schneider v. State (1939)) ... it may ban
commercial advertising in the form of handbills (Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942))

. . . A distributor of notices for a religious meeting

may not be barred from soliciting homeowners by an ordinance against
ringing doorbells to distribute advertisements (Martin v. City of
Struthers (1943))

. . . , but door to door solicitation for the sale of

magazines may be banned (Breard v. City of Alexandria, La.
(1951))

....

In the case at bar, the policy of the district reverses

these acceptable priorities and perversely gives preference to commercial advertising over nonmercantile messages.
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Women for Peace violates the first amendment. But the question
which the opinion of the court leaves in some confusion is just how
and why the advertising slots have become a forum for the expression of ideas. On this point the court says:
The second elementary factor we recognize is that the determination of the district to accept advertising on its motor coaches
serves as its considered conclusion that this form of communication will not interfere with its primary function of providing
transportation. Thus, we avoid the considerations applicable to
ascertaining whether public Property must be made available
as a forum for the exercise of First Amendments rights. (See
In re Hoffman (Cal. 1967) 64 Cal. Rptr. 97,434 P.2d 353). Here
that affirmative determination has been made by the district ...
Our problem, therefore, is reduced to a situation in which
a governmental agency has refused to accept an advertisement
expressing ideas admittedly protected by the First Amendment
for display in forum which the agency has deemed suitable for
the expression of ideas through the medium of paid advertisements.... We conclude that defendants, having opened a forum

for the expression of ideas by providing facilities for advertisements on its busses, cannot for reasons of administrative convenience decline to accept advertisements expressing opinions
and beliefs within the ambit of First Amendment protection.3s 2
The court then proceeds to quote Danskin v. Unified School District
as "directly in point."' 33 The quotation includes that portion of the
Danskin opinion which stresses that the state has no duty to make
public school buildings available for public meetings.
There are two possible models the court could be using on the
question of opening a forum-the school cases34 and the terminal
cases.3 5 By the school cases the citizen has no right to use school
facilities unless the state volunteers them by a general policy or by
practices allowing groups to use them."" In the terminal cases the
court requires that property be made available for the exercise of
first amendment rights unless the state can show such use would
interfere with the primary function of the terminal. 7 There is language in Wirta which suggests that the court might be following
either model.
32 -

33Id.

Cal. 2d at -, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.

" Cases cited note 18 supra.
" Cases cited note 20 supra.
"Cases cited note 18 supra.
Cases cited note 20 supra.

'*
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The school cases have the advantage of making it appear that the
state rather than the court has chosen to open the forum. But it is
difficult to make the school cases fit the facts in Wirta. Clearly
there was no transit district policy (similar to the statute in Danskin)"5 opening bus advertising to political, economic, and social discussion. Of course the acceptance of election advertisements alone
could be seen as "volunteering a forum." But there are problems
with this line of argument. If the existence of a forum on the bus
depends solely on the presence of election advertisements, then
the analogy to the school cases" suggests that the forum is open
only when the state decides to open it, that is, when the political
advertisements are accepted at election time. During this time the
district could not discriminate between election advertisements and
other protected speech. Using the theory that the district had "volunteered a forum" and relying only upon the acceptance of political
advertisements to prove it, the result might have been a much narrower forum than that the court found, a forum opened at the pleasure of the state for one month or so a year at election time. A second possible argument based on the school cases would be that the
acceptance of commercial advertisements volunteered a forum. But it
is difficult to show that the district decided to provide a place for the
expression of first amendment ideas by a policy which restricted its
advertising to ideas outside the protection of the first amendment."
In the school cases the finding that the school volunteered a forum
seems to have been based on the acceptance of ideas within the orbit
of the first amendment.4
In spite of some indications to the contrary, it seems that the
court in Wirta was following the rule of the terminal cases. But in
doing so, the court avoided any direct admission that the court's decision, rather than some action of the transit district, opened the
forum. The result is a hybrid. The majority's emphasis on a voluntary decision to open a forum makes it seem that the court is relying
on the school cases. But the reasons given for finding a forum
"Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d
885 (1946). The statute required the governing boards of school districts
to allow groups formed for political, educational, economic and other purposes to use the schools for meetings.
" Cases cited note 18 supra.
The only exception to the generalization is that election advertisements were accepted at certain times.
" See cases cited note 18 supra.
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(based on primary function 42 and the existence of the facility 8 ) are
taken from the terminal cases. Instead of confusing the basis of its
decision with the assertion that the district had "opened a forum,"
the court in Wirta should have admitted that it was requiring the
district to provide a forum.
In any event the rule of the terminal cases seems a sounder
basis for decision than the rule of the school cases. The conclusion
that the state need not make public school auditoriums available after
school hours unless it lets some groups use them (and that it can
withdraw them at will) is of questionable validity anyway." Of
course, there is no requirement that the state provide a facility so
that it can be used as a forum. It need not build a high school auditorium so that local groups can use it after school, or a bus terminal
so that leaflets can be distributed. Nor need it provide a system for
placing advertising on its busses. However, once a facility exists
which is an appropriate place for the exercise of first amendment
rights different questions are raised. Judicial inquiry should not end
with the discovery that in the memory of man no local groups have
been allowed to use the local public school auditorium. Rather
groups which want to use the schools after hours should be allowed
to do so unless that would place an intolerable burden on school
facilities and interfere with the primary function of the school."
That is the rule of the terminal cases. The same rule should be applied to advertising slots on busses. By establishing a system for
" The court treated the district's decision to accept advertisement as
proof that the acceptance of other advertisements would not interfere with
the primary function of the busses. The court treats the decision to accept
any advertisements as a decision that advertising will not interfere with the
primary function of the bus and hence as a decision to open a forum. Since
there would be no interference with primary function the conclusion based

on the terminal cases is clear: the advertising slots must be provided as a
forum. In addition to the primary function test there is probably also a
requirement that the place be an appropriate one for the exercise of first
amendment rights (or at least that it not be inappropriate). Compare Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) with Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966) and Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. N.Y.
1967).
" The court's argument in Wirta that the district had opened a forum
"by providing facilities for advertisements," - Cal. 2d at -, 434 P.2d at
985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433, on its busses also suggests reliance on the terminal
cases. For, under the dicta of the school cases, merely providing a facility,
such as a school auditorium, is not enough.
"Van Alystyne, Political Speakers at State Universities, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 328, 338 (1962).
"' Id. at 339. Cases rited note 20 supra,
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accepting commercial advertisements (like building a terminal or
school auditorium) the district has provided a facility that could
reasonably be used for the expression of first amendment rights. It
need not establish the facility. Once it does, however, it should
not be allowed to reject advertisements protected by the first amendment and for which space is available unless it can show that to
accept them would intolerably burden the busses and interfere with
their primary purpose for providing transportation.
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS

Constitutional Law-Chronic Alcoholism
and the Eighth Amendment in North Carolina
A man gets up in the morning and the first thing he does is to
"take a drink." From that point on throughout the day he is constantly "taking a drink." By mid-afternoon or early evening, he is
picked up by the police for public drunkenness. Far from being his
first "offense," this series of events has happened to him many times
before-sometimes ending with arrest and sometimes not. This
man is a chronic alcoholic; he suffers from a disease and has no
control over his behavior.' Should he be punished as a "public
drunk" or is it "cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth
amendment to do so? Recently several courts across the nation
have faced this question and reached conflicting results. The following is a brief attempt to highlight these decisions and some
future problems raised therein.
The first such case was Driver v. Hinnant.2 Defendant had
been found guilty of a violation of a North Carolina statute making it a misdemeanor for "any person ... [to] be found drunk or
intoxicated on the public highway, or at any public place or meeting," 3 and sentenced to two year's imprisonment. Driver had been
convicted of the same offense over 200 times previously. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in a per curiam opinion
that the sentences were authorized by the statute and therefore that
See authorities collected in Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 n. 6
(4th Cir. 1966).
-356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). See also, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 818 (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953). As will be shown and discussed,
infra, this statute underwent significant amendment in 1967,

